Abstract: . . .  -.30 (.07)** Atlantic -.01 (.10) West .13 (.07) Québec -.12 (.15) Catholic .13 (.06)* Visible minority -.01 (.11) Female .11 (.06)* Dropout -.04 (.08) University -.11 (.06) _cut1 .04 (.15) _cut2 .73 (.15) _cut3 2.17 (.16) N 2423 Pseudo R 2 .12 *: significant a = .05 ; **: significant a = .01 Note : Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients and standard errors are in parentheses. 20 Page 21 Table 5: Liberal Vote Choice Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Anger - - - - - -.41 (.27) No confident - - - - -1.26** (.27) -1.26** (.27) Bad job - - - -1.35** (.25) -.79** (.29) -.72* (.29) Martin aware - - -.99** (.19) -.74** (.20) -.57** (.21) -.53* (.21) Corruption - -.94** (.27) -.90** (.28) -.81** (.28) -.69* (.30) -.58 (.30) Information . . .
. . .  appears that views about scandals are not highly coloured by partisan predispositions, perhaps because they are “exceptional” events to which people react on the basis of other predispositions. The most fundamental predisposition seems to be one’s general view about politics and politicians. On this point, we have some intriguing results. One the one hand, the overall level of political cynicism does not appear to have risen after the scandal. 28 On the other hand, one’s prior views about politicians strongly affected how one 15 Page 16 perceived the scandal. The effect was pervasive, as the most cynical reacted more harshly in nearly every way. Evaluations of Paul Martin’s handling of the affair, in particular, were much more negative among the . . .
. . .  specific individuals who committed some wrongdoing. But others are also usually implicated. Others may have known about the wrongdoing, or suspected something, yet did nothing to prevent or report it. If others did not know, the question arises: was it their responsibility to know. In short who is to be blamed, and who is not to be blamed? Survey evidence of the political psychology of voters’ reactions to corruption scandals is limited. We know that scandals matter, that candidates who are accused or convicted of corruption get fewer votes (Peters and Welch 1980), that the Watergate scandal culminated in the resignation of President Nixon and drained the Republican vote in the subsequent presidential election (Norporth 1984; Frey and Schneider . . .
. . .  about a scandal, the smaller the damage. Finally, the data do not support the view that reactions to the scandal are mostly affective, that a scandal has a notable impact on the vote only if people are enraged. Many Canadians did react emotionally; as many as 40% said they were angry. But the data seem to indicate anger was not a necessary or sufficient condition motivating voters to punish the Liberals. That decision was the product of a combination of perceptions and opinions. 16 Page 17 Table 1: Perceptions of Corruption Under Chrétien Model 1 Model 2 Information 1.43 (.11)** 1.23 (.15)** PID Liberal -.21 (.07)** -.05 (.15) PID Conservative .56 (.08)** .04 (.22) PID NDP -.10 (.11) -.24 (.33) PID Bloc .31 (.15)* -.68 (.30)* Cynicism .86 (.08)** . . .
--3000,4,375,3308,56756