Abstract: . . .  O. Sargentich, The Dele- gation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process , 36 A M . U. L. R EV . 419, 429 (1987) (explaining the functional critique of the nondelegation principle, which argues that only broad delegations can provide the flexibility needed in a complex modern society); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine , 36 A M . U. L. R EV . 323, 329 (1987) (arguing that increased reliance on delegating power to administrative agencies has been brought about  . . .
. . .  purportedly represent.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 14 (“The President and his close personal aides cannot directly review all or even any significant portion of agency rulemaking deci- sions.”). Page 17 S EIDENFELD . DOC 02/05/02 10:38 AM 2001] PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1075 cording to the White House’s preferences for a particular rule when those preferences can be discerned. When the president has not taken a public stance, the agency still might make some reasonable guesses about the preferences . . .
. . .  represent.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 51, at 14 (“The President and his close personal aides cannot directly review all or even any significant portion of agency rulemaking deci- sions.”). Page 17 S EIDENFELD . DOC 02/05/02 10:38 AM 2001] PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY 1075 cording to the White House’s preferences for a particular rule when those preferences can be discerned. When the president has not taken a public stance, the agency still might make some reasonable guesses about the preferences of . . .
. . .  Principles , 36 A M . U. L. R EV . 345, 345 (1987) (noting that the legitimacy of Congress’s power to delegate broad authority to administrative agencies recently has faced heavier questioning from critics); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Dele- gation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process , 36 A M . U. L. R EV . 419, 429 (1987) (explaining the functional critique of the nondelegation principle, which argues that only broad delegations can provide the flexibility needed in a complex modern . . .
. . .  addressed in a rule, agency staff members reasonably could predict that OIRA will favor that stance. First, those who disagree with the president’s ideology are unlikely to apply for OIRA desk of- ficer positions. In addition to this self selection, the political nature of the selection of such officers will weed out some applicants whose ap- proach to regulation generally is in tension with that of the president. Finally, the work of desk officers will be monitored by the director of OIRA, and that . . .
. . .  process for promul- 75 . See Morrison, supra note 55, at 1065 (contending that Reagan used executive oversight of rulemaking to place “the elimination of cost to industry above all other considerations”); Percival, supra note 54, at 181 (arguing that OMB review focused inordinately on the cost of rules). 76 . See Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles , 36 A M . U. L. R EV . 345, 345 (1987) (noting that the legitimacy of Congress’s power to delegate broad authority to administrative agencies recently . . .
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